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In terms of local and traditional peace and state building in Africa, the Somaliland experience stands out 
clearly. A series of peace conferences since 1991 led and owned by Somalilanders themselves resulted in 
a peaceful and democratic transition and a hybrid political order. A study on Hybrid Security Governance 
in Africa, the case of Somaliland offers important lessons concerning our general theories about security 
governance in Africa, the role that political elites play in conflict resolution, indigenous systems of 
governance, and the failure of existing international approaches to state reconstruction. We can point to 
concrete observations from more than three years of researching hybrid security governance. The article 
provides a comparative analysis on the experiences of Somaliland and its neighbor Puntland to further 
shed light on the nature of hybrid security order in the Horn of Africa. It also explores the assumptions 
embedded in the works of the classic Western theorists in the light of the experiences of Somaliland and 
Puntland in order to show that the underlying conceptual structure of international state reconstruction 
work needs to be rethought. This emerging evidence of organic approaches to building and sustaining 
peace in parts of Africa offer lessons for other parts of the world. As such, understanding the processes 



















In the conflict-ridden Horn of Africa, particularly in the weak states of Sudan, South Sudan, and Somalia, 
Western led peace-making has become a key means for the West to create states, fund and drive peace 
processes, intervene in the internal affairs of states, and press on these states wholly unsuitable Western 
institutions of governance. The process in Somaliland and to some extent neighboring Puntland however 
departs from this norm. The processes of conflict resolution and peace building in Somaliland and 
Puntland have followed a markedly different trajectory from that of many countries in the Horn of Africa 
and the results are glaringly evident. Particularly Somaliland represents a resilient and dynamic hybrid, 
which needs to be better understood. Currently we do not know enough as the evidence base for and 
scholarship on exactly why and how this happened in these areas and not in others is insufficient. Besides 
there has never been any attempt to compare the two. The article covers the salient features on the 
political transitions in Somaliland and Puntland and how this impacted on peace and state reconstruction. 
The author followed rigorous procedures in identifying similarities and differences and their import on 
the nature and scope of hybridity in both regions. 
Almost all aspects of comparison, not just the one specifically on hybridity- and the role of traditional 
leadership in it- contain an implicit, as yet underdeveloped, critique of prevailing paradigms for peace and 
state building. The political reconstruction in both, narrowing its focus to a single issue of peace building, 
illustrates how this comes about. One way to address what connects them all is to understand through 
our comparative analysis how the specific contexts in which political and armed movements develop 
impacts on the nature of hybridity. This lens in turn allows us to tackle the broader issues identified here. 
In this article peace building experiences and hybrid political orders in the two critical polities in Somalia 
is examined in order to amend the assumptions the international community brings to state 
reconstruction—not only in the Horn of Africa but elsewhere. To be sure, the liberal peacebuiling 
approach has not managed to deliver stable peace and security. Since 1991 the international system has 
struggled and failed to recreate a state on the territory of the former Somalia. Rather proto-state systems 
have been formed by Somalis themselves in Somaliland and Puntland and alternative forms and structures 
of governance and order exist in other parts of Somalia, but none enjoys international recognition 
(Leonard & Samantar, 2013). These structures are often of a hybrid nature.  
These include the incorporation of local or traditional authority figures into parts of formal governance, 
and efforts to institutionalize and professionalize local or traditional judicial mechanisms, or both. The 
concept of hybridity highlights the existence of multiple non-state providers of “security, welfare and 
representation”, as the state shares “authority, legitimacy, and capacity” with other actors, networks and 
institutions that transcend the formal/informal distinction (Wennmann, 2009).  Somaliland and Puntland 
can be characterized in this way. So far, there has been little study of how and why this came about. 
Besides, hybrid refers to the fact that the informal systems are not well understood in the literature. 
Clearly, the clan elders have played a crucial role in the peaceful transition, and are now a similarly 
significant force in contemporary government, jointly with elected politicians. Meanwhile, Somaliland has 
a functioning, effective and legitimate political order. This order combines customary institutions in 
particular councils of elders (Guurti) and modern state institutions based on free and fair elections, such 
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as a parliament and a president. Yet in emphasizing hybrid governance and hybrid orders we are not fully 
acquainted with the specific socio-economic and political contexts that allow traditional leadership to play 
a preeminent role in political transitions.   
The case of Somaliland and to some extent the Puntland region thus departs consciously and deliberately 
from the case in many African countries where ‘state-building’ and corresponding security sector reform 
(SSR) processes focus on structural and formal institutional arrangements of the state, rather aiming in 
principle at a hybrid political and security order in which the security sector and security governance came 
to reflect a clan, customary, and state organizations and structures. Unlike the process in the rest of 
Somalia, which depends on foreign aid and military coercion, the process in Somaliland, and to some 
extent Puntland, relied on home-grown institutions, processes and interest groups. Unlike most parts of 
Somalia, which followed top-down approaches of state and peace building, Somaliland and Puntland 
followed bottom-up approaches. Central to both peace processes are traditional mechanisms of conflict 
resolution, incorporating the role of traditional leadership, which is largely disregarded in many parts of 
southern Somalia. 
Thus, this African case study has much to offer global processes in the same way that global approaches 
might contain important lessons for Africa. Viewed in this way, much can be made of the evidence that 
challenges conventional assumptions and patterns of peace building – some of which confirm what is 
already known in the literature; and others which might belong in the realm of emerging/ new evidence. 
We already know, for example, that while Somaliland and Puntland followed similar trajectory of peace 
building there are important differences that needs to be taken into account, and the article attempts to 
provide the subtlety in both experiences. The fact that Somaliland’s hybrid security governance was 
developed independent of donor influence is also very important. As such the comparative analysis 
between Somaliland and Puntland builds on the research on hybrid security governance in Somaliland.  
2. Perspectives on Somaliland and Puntland. 
It is often contended that state reconstruction in Puntland since the mid-1990s resembles that of 
Somaliland. Both Puntland and Somaliland are located in Northern regions of Somalia. They both 
integrated traditional leaders into the political decision making. Unlike in much of south Somalia where 
war lords and their militias dominated politics the systems of governance in Somaliland and Puntland 
were shaped through extensive, locally led processes of consultation with citizens of assemblies of elders 
and their representatives (Leonard & Samantar, 2013). The similarities emanate from having the earlier 
liberation movements to the Barre regime to acquiring liberated territories which formed a basis for a 
nascent administration which in turn allowed for a locally owned and locally funded political process to 
happen (Medhane, 2008). In 1991, Somali National Movement/SNM/ captured the north western regions 
of Somalia which became known as Somaliland. The Somalia Salvation Democratic Front/SSDF/ led by 
Abbdullahi Yosuf took over Puntland after successfully expelling an Islamist extremist group in 1992. 
However it was in 1998 that Puntland was established as an autonomous regional administration. 
Both processes were aided by father-like figures that had history and name in Somali politics long before 
the collapse of the Somali state in 1991. Most important of all there was minimal foreign interference in 
5 
 
the peace processes a stark difference from the heavy handed foreign involvement and massive 
intervention of regional and western powers in southern Somalia. Though the regional grouping IGAD and 
particularly Ethiopia is said to have encouraged Abdullahi Yosuf of Puntland to pursue a bottom-up 
approach to peace and security the process was solely led by Puntland political and clan leaders(Medhane, 
2015). Puntland’s formula for integrating clans and traditional leaders mirrored that developed at 
Somaliland’s formative conferences. In a way, leaders in Puntland mimicked Somaliland, establishing a 
government through inter-clan conferences and traditional authorities (Hoehne, 2015).  Indeed a major 
common theme that requires rigorous analysis would be the dominant role of leading export traders in 
the political economy of Somaliland and Puntland. This refers to the nature of Somali pastoralism one 
which is characterized by a unique but highly developed capitalist system, dominated by a handful of 
export traders based in the port of Berbera (Somaliland) and to a lesser extent Bosasso (Puntland). 
In the 1990’s, the leading export traders of Berbera have played a key role in establishing and stabilizing 
the Somaliland state, while those in Bosaso have played a similar role in the north-east. Hence, a major 
consideration is the role of a domestic capitalist class in the formative political processes in both areas. 
Examining the role of export particularly livestock traders in the political reconstruction of Somaliland and 
Puntland is critical in understanding the different trajectories of peace building in Somalia as a whole. 
However the similarities end there. Evidently, the process in Somaliland was far more conclusive than the 
one in Puntland. The colonial history is different which has an impact on the political culture and conduct 
of the political elite. While Somaliland was established as a successor to the British Protectorate, Puntland 
emerged as the administration for all Harti clans in the north-east. The separate existence of Somaliland, 
therefore, is based on a territorial logic and Puntland on a genealogical logic.  
Whether it is about the robust presence of traditional leadership, a strong livestock trading class or 
educated and technocratic political elite in Somaliland, the impact of a unique British rule should not be 
discounted. This largely explains the origin and development of a hybrid political order in Somaliland. On 
a relative level, the British colonial system in Somaliland did neither oppress nor modernize it. British 
colonialism in Somaliland could be described as’ indirect of an indirect rule’. One of these explanations 
pointed out that Somaliland has not been a Colony, but a Protectorate, with less detectable mineral and 
agricultural resources than other regions in Africa. The British had occupied it but their presence and 
ambition was minimal. The British occupied Somaliland in order to safeguard their position in Aden and 
to assure the supply of mutton to their military Garrison there. The Somaliland clan chiefs signed treaties 
with Britain between 1884 and 1886 and proclaimed as Protectorate in 1887. Although the role played by 
the British Colonial rule in Somaliland in the conservation of the traditional system of governance is 
undeniable and has been closely related to the above mentioned facts, nevertheless unlike the most of 
the East and West Africa countries, where certain level of modernization had been introduced by the 
British Colonial administration, Somaliland had been exception and remained largely out of the main 
stream of urbanization in those colonial times.  
The British Colonial administration left the country without significant change, without slightest feature 
of modernization, a country without single paved road, without modern agriculture and without single 
industrial site. As the saying goes ‘the British left this part of the country almost as they found it’ (Adem 
Musa Jibril, 2005). It is critical here to mention that the British left behind only six elementary schools, 
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four Intermediate schools, and only one secondary school. Moreover, British education authorities 
prohibited political literature and practice in the schools with the aim to produce generations of non-
politicized class of technocrats for their Colonial purposes (Ibid, 2011)2. One would argue that in 
Somaliland, to a degree, Western ministerial political values have been infused with pastoral democracy. 
Equally prominent and markedly different from Puntland is the collective sense of victimhood in the war 
against Siad Barre in which the government in the south destroyed entire towns in the north-west of the 
country and bombed their inhabitants. As pressures rose up against Siad Barre, the regime becomes more 
aggressive escalating repressive measures against the entire Somali people in general and Somaliland in 
particular.  
In 1988 Somaliland has turned into a battlefield, and serious attempts were made to cleansing the whole 
Issaqi population in order to force them to surrender and embed their land to other Somali clans. As 
events moved ahead the regime's focus turned on against the Issaqi population, in a time when the centre 
of the resistance tilted towards the north. From the early 1980s, the north was administered by 
increasingly harsh rule emanating from the capital, with savage reprisals meted out to the local 
population, who were assumed to be pro-SNM and subjected to severe economic and political harassment 
(I.M.Lewis, 2008). The aims and objectives of this notorious policy were to clear away the resistance of 
SNM supporters as the backbone of the armed opposition. This is because SNM has sustained strong mass 
movement, throughout the ten years of armed struggle, during which the regime was deeply involved in 
a practical implementation of infamous policy of ''divide and rule'', the aim of which was to isolate the 
SNM in order to deny of them the support and solidarity from the other Somali clans 
The second critical issue to look at refers to the presence of a vibrant trading class that has been key to 
the political reconstruction of Somaliland. In spite of the lack of interest to develop the main economic 
sectors, the British needed Somaliland as a marketplace for cheap and fresh meat for its military in the 
Aden Colony and as a result there emerged and flourished livestock trade between the Aden Colony and 
Somaliland. Out of this regional trade opportunities, trade between Somaliland and Aden Colony 
flourished and a class of livestock traders emerged, whose financial growth of capital was unparalleled in 
any part in the Somali speaking region. This has led to the expansion of Berbera, Burao and Hargeisa cities 
to become the most important commercial boom in the Somali region. Those commercial livestock traders 
also become the wealthiest indigenous class in the Somali region. Whilst, in the Italian Somali part import 
export trade has been entirely under the control of the Italians and Yemeni traders throughout the 
colonial period, and remained so until late 1960s. 
 
3. The SNM as a Liberation Movement 
The third major distinction lies in the nature of the SNM and SSDF as ‘liberation movements’. The political 
and organizational form of SNM corresponded to the nature of the Somaliland society and the rationale 
on the ground. Organizational and leadership make-up of the SNM, in relative terms, was far more 
                                                          
2 Discussions with Adem Musa;Hargiessa,June 2005. 
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democratic than the SSDF. The central and executive committees of the SNM, as well as the military 
command of the organization represented the urban elite and their political orientations. On the other 
hand, the Council of elders (Guurti) represented the traditional value of governance and both had their 
respective roles as well as joint missions. The alliance of these forces came as a result of a historical 
necessity dictated by times of difficulties. In spite of its heterogeneous character the SNM had been a 
cohesive and truly democratic organization. Unlike the SSDF which was led by a strongman, the SNM was 
like an egalitarian organization. From the beginning, the Movement practiced a degree of internal 
democracy unique amongst the Somali resistance movements of the period (Drysdale, 1994). SNM 
differed from SSDF in three important respects: first it applied democratic processes as its leaders were 
freely and fairly elected periodically; secondly, it was led by its best educated and most experienced 
professionals, politicians, diplomats; and thirdly its main revenue came from individuals monthly 
contribution from Issaq professionals, workers and businessman in the Diaspora. 
SNMs ability to conduct six general party congresses in the ten years of the armed struggle marked its 
internal strength and stamina as modern democratic as well as customary oriented mass organization. At 
the conclusion of each these congresses the top leadership of the organization had been either re-elected 
or changed democratically and peacefully. As far as the leadership of the SNM and its impact on hybridity 
is concerned one can point to the manner in which the organization has been strictly following, the 
bottom-up and participatory approaches in conducting its General Congresses. During elections, the 
procedure demanded that each clan-community's share in the Central Committee of the party should go 
through a specific procedure. Each clan would select 20 persons to be their candidates to the Central 
Committee, and then the Congress would endorse only ten among them (Adem, 2005). That modus 
operandi combines both systems, the traditional and modern aspects concerning the election process. 
This is to make sure the quality of leadership, in one aspect and on the other to guarantee the democratic 
participation of the communities. The communities used to choose their candidates on consensus basis, 
whilst the procedure included democratic election of both bottom-up and up-bottom approaches. 
Abdullahi Yosuf’s of SSDF on the other hand remained a one man show. This had an impact on the level 
and quality of participation by the traditional leadership in the political processes. Formed in 1979 
following a failed coup in the wake of the Ogaden war, the group was dominated by Majeerteen officers 
led by Abdullahi Yosuf. Besides, it was awash with huge amount of foreign cash, prominently from the 
Libyan leader Mummer Ghadafi. Worthy to mention here is that the other two organizations of the South 
of Somalia at the time, the SSDF, and the United Somali Congress led by General Mohamed Farah Aided 
had not been experiencing any kind of internal democracy. This fact reflected the dissimilarities of the 
two Somali sides of the opposition to the regime in Mogadishu, as it clearly reflected in the everlasting 
failures met by the peace process in the South. On the other hand, the SNM track had been just the 
opposite. Hence, a major starting point of consideration in this comparative analysis is the SNM as an 
African Liberation Movement.  
Although not party to grand decolonization era, the decade long war of the SNM resembles the second 
liberation movements that the Horn of Africa gave birth in the 1980s. But unlike the rest of them, which 
were hierarchical and had a strong military character, the SNM remained an egalitarian organization. The 
SNM is a different construct, definitely in Somalia (Medhane, 2003).  While its focus on armed struggle 
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against the Barre regime makes it slightly similar to other armed liberation movements in Somalia and the 
region at large, its failure to link its struggle with a strong ambition for power and control distances it from 
other liberation movements in Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea. Partly as a result of this the SNM crumbled 
during in-fighting between 1992 and 1995. This had impacted on the transition to power and the 
emergence of Somaliland as an independent entity by an assembly of elders meeting at Burco on 18 May 
1991 and the election of Mohammed Ibrahim Egal, who was not part of the SNM leadership, as president 
in 1993. Ibrahim Egal, had not been part of the SNM struggle, but enjoyed respect as an elder statesman. 
The reasoning behind his selection is that there was no single party strong enough to wield undue political 
influence. A key consideration is the nature of funding the reconciliation processes. One of these is 
undoubtedly the sense of local ‘ownership’ of the process.  
Negotiations occurred largely away from the view of external actors. Unlike in south Somalia the vast bulk 
of the money required in Somaliland’s reconciliation meetings was sourced from Somalilanders – either 
in the diaspora or within the country. Subsequently, people in Somaliland adopted local traditions of 
conflict settlement and—in the absence of external support—succeeded in rebuilding a peaceful, stable, 
largely democratic polity that, by early 2017, had lasted for longer than two decades. Using indigenous 
peace-making procedures, the various Somaliland communities held a considerable number of local 
meetings and national conferences to re-establish the peace between the different communities and laid 
the foundations for a hybrid political order and security governance mechanisms.  
In a comparable way, all political systems are hybrids of formal—meaning rule-bound--and informal—
meaning based on personal relationships. However, Somaliland stands out as a strong evidence base for 
the survival and resilience of hybrid orders. It subscribes to those systems that combine formalized 
procedures from both inside and outside the formal sector. These include the incorporation of local or 
traditional authority figures into parts of formal governance. And the preconditions for it where provided 
by the nature and modus operandi of the SNM and the political elite outside of it.  It also means to a large 
extent the essence of the Somali social characteristics, the ''Pastoral Democracy'' which was entrenched 
into the soil of theory by Prof. I. M. Lewis half a century ago didn't yet dry up all-at-once as it continues to 
be an influential factor in uniting the different factions of the SNM and enriching Somaliland’s political 
transition.  However, the extensive local political consultations and traditional conflict settlement that led 
to hybrid political order could be threatened by the emergence of new forces such as Islamists and 
Diasporic elites who has a strong sense of competition and a ‘winner takes all’ attitude(ADP,2008).  
4. The Role of New Actors 
The impact of the Diaspora in the socio-economic and political life of Somalis is glaringly evident. The 
economic influence of the Somali Diaspora is greatly reflected in politics as many Somalis from the US and 
Europe have continued to rise to cabinet positions and top echelons of political power.  
Similarly, political Islam had advanced considerably it led to the emergence of powerful armed groups and 
powerful political players. Political Islam is not new to Africa, but has evolved over the last two decade in 
more significant ways. This is not just a reflection of jihadist group’s recent inventiveness and adaptation, 
but the culmination of longer-term historical and global trends (Medhane, 2003). It has continued to 
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spread building both on economic decline, moral populism, international connectedness and classic 
vulnerabilities of the state. Indeed, it is among these variables that the deeper and enduring sources of 
violent extremism and its solutions can be located (Ibid, 2016). The regional state of Puntland was 
established soon after the military defeat of the Islamist. On the other hand it took several years for 
Islamists to enter military politics in Somaliland. Meanwhile, in recent years the influence of radical Islamic 
groups in Somaliland has gone to the extent of attempting a force-backed takeover of power in October 
2015. However, Islamists began practicing significant political roles from 2010, when they occupied key 
posts in Mr. Silaanyo's government, from 2010 to 2015 during which they had been fully in charge in the 
Somaliland government through the Minister of the Presidency. The purpose of the coup was believed to 
be an attempt to have an exclusive Islamist government the forms of which are not yet clear.  Largely out 
of favor at the top, Islamists are still very much a feature of Somaliland electoral politics. In spite of this 
failure at take-over of political power the fact remains that political Islam has already established strong 
political basis all over the Somali inhabited regions, if not in the Horn region at large(Adem,2016). The 
following factors helped the Salafist's ideals to thrive in this region and beyond. 
 The huge Petrodollar funds streaming from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf States, 
mainly in the form Al-Zakat send through Islamic Charities to be passed to the poor and needy people, but 
instead used in business and in politics, through which political Islam gradually become overriding in what 
is known as a war economy. 
 The second area they conquered is in the field of Islamic education institutions where they have 
changed the entire Islamic education system that previously belonged to the Sufis sect of Islam, and which 
they turned it into politicized institutions of the Wahhabist variant, to the extent that in Hargeisa alone, 
for instance people are talking about the presence of around thousand Mosques, while there were only 8 
Mosques in Hargeisa 25 years ago (Ibid). Now all that become Salafia nests, and there operates much 
higher number of Koranic schools (Madrassas) with much more number of private Islamic schools of all 
levels that run by Political Islam. This is on the top of scholarships given to Somali youth by Saudi and 
Sudanese universities. 
 
 There are reports that many students from these schools have joined Al-shabaab, some reports 
mentioned that 80 students only from one of these school in two years.   
 The third area of strong economic domain is the Hawaala, the well-known Money transfer system. 
 The fourth area they conquered is the Islamic banking. Through these Banks they have managed 
to monopolise the entire financial system. Noteworthy here is that they have been blocking the private 
non Islamic law to be passed by the Somaliland Parliament for the last ten years. 3 
                                                          
3 Discussions with Adem Musa Jibril and several political and civil society leaders in Hargeissa and Addis Ababa over 
the years attest to the same analysis. 
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Many parts of the continent continue to be attractive to international and local jihadist groups, which 
could become parasitic on prevailing socio-economic problems, seizing upon ideological dimensions to 
local grievance. The same applies to Puntland and Somaliland cannot be any different except that it is not 
rewarded for its achievement in promoting peace and reconciliation. Moreover, the lack of international 
recognition also imperils foreign support and development aid which continues to perpetuate the existing 
socio-economic problems. This fact alone plays into the ideology of the Islamists as they continue to 
belittle the failure of the international system to help local people; hence able to mobilize public opinion 
for extremist agendas. 
It is clear that Islamists and the Diaspora command strong economic leverage and have shown greater 
political ambitions than in previous years. Their economic influence and conduct of politics might not bode 
well with the continuation of a peaceful, democratic, and progressive hybrid political order, the full impact 
of which remains to be seen. Nonetheless, it can be argued that the evolving political configuration favors 
city dwellers, intellectuals and members of the diaspora over ordinary people from the hinterlands and 
traditional leaders, slowly eroding the hybrid political system and security governance for which 
Somaliland has been known (JEAS, 2013). We therefore need to know the exact nature of the new forces 
entering Somaliland politics and their impact on hybridity. It is important to know how hybrid processes 
and institutions respond under stress, or when both internal and external conditions change.  
Yet emphasizing on hybrid governance and hybrid orders should not equate with objecting to the 
possibility of establishing modern political parties or viable states. Rather it means that hybrid systems 
are not static. Indeed Somaliland proves that they are not relics of the past either, doomed to be swept 
aside. On the contrary, they are dynamic and flexible. Indeed, some of them may continue to overwhelm 
institutionalized forms of formal government. These being the case hybrid institutions represent the 
current governance in Somaliland; they are dynamic, resilient, and locally and regionally linked into both 
formal and informal systems of political support, communications and finance—often including security 
governance at all levels. They frequently overrun or subvert recognized forms of governance, justice, and 
security.  
It should be stressed that the use of hybridity here does not involve value judgments. Hybrid institutions 
of governance may help or subvert, succeed or fail; may benefit or oppress. However, this in itself is a 
significant departure from the normative terminology of failed, weak, clientelistic, patrimonial and 
predatory states. Hence, the case of Somaliland is a strong reminder that we will continue to move beyond 
state-centric notions of justice and security, and allow for a more complete conceptualization of the 
complex ways formal, informal and hybrid actors enhance and diminish them. Insofar as we accept the 
presence of strong hybrid security governance as a normative element, we presume that a progressive 
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